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MAKING FREE TRADE MORE FAIR: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
PROTECTING LABOR RIGHTS 
By Maria Lorena Cook, Morley Gunderson, Mark Thompson, and Anil Verma. 
Anil Verma is with the Faculty of Management at the Univer-
sity of Toronto in Toronto, Ontario Canada. Morley Gunderson is 
also with the University of Toronto. Mark Thompson is with the 
University of British Columbia, and Maria Lorena Cook is with 
Cornell University. 
©1997 by Maria Lorena Cook, Morley Gunderson, Mark Thompson, and Anil 
Verma. 
Report of the IRRA-NAFTA Committee for 1996-97. Authors' names are listed in 
alphabetical order. The report benefited from the contributions of committee 
members Enrique de la Garza, Lance Compa and Russell Smith. Anil Verma 
served as the Convenor. Copies of the committee's full 27-page report are available 
through the IRRA national office, UW-Madison, 1180 Observatory Dr., 4233 
Social Science Bldg., Madison, WI 53706 (608/262-2762). 
The IRRA-NAFTA Committee was first appointed in 1995 by then president, 
Walter Gershenfeld, to make a report to the membership on the industrial relations 
implications of NAFTA and other trade-related developments. The Committee's 
mandate was renewed in 1996 by president Hoyt Wheeler. In this year's report the 
committee focused on some of the attempts that are underway to improve protec-
tion of labor interests under free trade conditions. This is a summary of the longer 
full report available upon request from the IRRA National Office. 
APPLICATION OF THE LABOR PRINCIPLES IN THE NAALC 
The 1996 report of the Committee discussed the procedures contained in the 
NAALC for dealing with alleged violations of the eleven "labor principles" in the 
Agreement (Verma et al. 1996). 
In addition to the cases discussed in last year's report, this section will address 
two new cases submitted during 1996: the case of the Fisheries Ministry Union in 
Mexico (SUTSP), and the case of Maxi-Switch, also in Mexico. As of this writing in 
May 1997, a total of seven cases have been submitted and accepted for review by 
either the U.S. or the Mexican National Administrative Offices.1 
The Honeywell/GE Case2 
The first submission was filed in April 1994 by the International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters and the United Electrical Workers (UE), alleging violations of the 
principle of freedom of association by Honeywell and General Electric at separate 
maquiladoras in northern Mexico. The submissions charged that employees were 
dismissed for union activity, which is illegal under Mexican labor law. The union 
1
 One of these cases was withdrawn in 1994 after its 
acceptance by the U.S. NAO. Consequently, it will not 
be examined here. On May 16, 1997, the U.S. National 
Administrative Office received a submission concern-
ing pregnancy-based sex discrimination in Mexico's 
maquiladora sector. The petitioners were Human 
Rights Watch Womens Rights Project, Human Rights 
Watch/Americas, the International Labor Rights 
Fund, and the Asociacion Nacional de Abogados 
Democraticos. If the case is accepted, it would re-
present the eighth case to be filed and the first to deal 
with a principle other than freedom of association. 
namely, employment discrimination. Matters concern-
ing employment discrimination may go as far as an 
Evaluation Committee of Experts under the NAALC. 
' More detailed description of the cases discussed in 
this paper can be found in Cook et al. (1997). the full 
report of the IRRA-NAFTA Committee, available 
from the IRRA National Office upon request. 
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involved at both plants was an independent organization, not affiliated with the 
pro-government CTM (Confederation of Mexican Workers). Honeywell and Gen-
eral Electric denied that the dismissals were due to union activity, but were based 
on employee misconduct and economic conditions facing the plants. 
After consulting with the submitting unions and representatives of the corpo-
rations involved in the cases, the US NAO commissioned two studies of the 
treatment of freedom of association and the right to organize in Mexican labor law 
and administration. It then scheduled a public hearing on September 12, 1994 in 
Washington, D. C. on the submission and invited all parties to testify. Only trade 
union representatives appeared at the hearing. Honeywell and General Electric did 
not testify, but did file written statements. A former employee from each of the 
two plants involved in the submission, accompanied by representatives of their 
union, described their efforts to organize a union there. Four Mexican labor lawyers 
described tactics used by employers in Mexico to discourage the organization of 
"independent" unions, i.e., organizations not affiliated with the CTM. Lawyers 
representing the Teamsters and a staff person from the Ontario Federation of 
Labour presented their recommendations. 
The NAO report issued in October 1994, noted that its purpose was not to 
determine the veracity of the allegations in the unions' submissions or the employ-
ers' replies. Rather the purpose of the review was to gather information and 
publicly report on the Government of Mexico's enforcement of its labor law. It 
summarized the substance of the union and employer positions in the two cases and 
reviewed the application of Mexican law to such disputes. It found that since there 
is no unemployment insurance program in Mexico, workers discharged from their 
jobs frequently accept severance pay instead of pursuing other legal remedies. In 
light of the "dearth of practical knowledge" in the three countries about legislation 
in the other countries covering freedom of association and the right to organize, the 
NAO recommended that the countries work together to promote understanding of 
these matters in their respective labor laws. The report also recommended that 
greater efforts be made to inform the public about the NAALC and its operation, 
labor laws in each country and the role of the NAO's. The report did not 
recommend ministerial consultations under Article 22 on the grounds that it did 
not find that the Mexican government had failed to promote compliance with or 
enforce its legislation covering the two cases. (US Department of Labor, 1994). 
The Sony Case 
The pattern of the first two complaints was varied slightly in the subsequent 
submission, from the International Labor Rights Fund, the Coalition for Justice in 
the Maquiladoras, the American Friends Service Committee and the National 
Association of Democratic Lawyers (from Mexico) against Sony, for alleged viola-
tions of freedom of association, also at a maquiladora in northern Mexico. The 
substance of the submission concerned workers' efforts to organize a union indepen-
dent of the dominant CTM. As summarized in the 1996 Committee report, the 
NAO accepted the submission for review, held a public hearing, gathered informa-
tion from other sources and issued a report that included a recommendation for 
ministerial consultations. It also recommended that the three countries in the 
Agreement work together on union democracy and elections. The NAO also agreed 
to study cases before the Mexican Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board 
involving allegations of unjustified dismissals. In their consultation, the three 
ministers agreed to examine union registration and certification, and to commission 
an independent study of labor law on these subjects (Compa 1995). 
©1997. August. Labor Law Journal 
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The Sprint Case 
The first Mexican submission was filed in February 1995 by the Telephone 
Workers' Union of the Republic of Mexico, concerning the closing of La Conexion 
Familiar (LCF), a telemarketing operation in California owned by the Sprint 
Corporation. In brief, the Mexican NAO accepted the submission, which involved 
an effort by the Communications Workers of America (CWA) to organize a group 
of predominantly Latina workers (see Verma et al. 1996 for earlier coverage of the 
case). One week before an NLRB election in July 1994, Sprint closed the plant, 
citing business losses. The result of the consultation between the U.S. and Mexican 
Secretaries of Labor was an agreement to address the issues raised in the submis-
sion: the US Secretary of Labor would keep the Mexican counterpart informed of 
legal developments in the case; the Secretariat of the Commission for Labor 
Cooperation would prepare a study on the effects of sudden plant closing on the 
principle of freedom of association; and the US Department of Labor would hold a 
public forum in San Francisco to allow interested parties to express their concerns 
on the impact of sudden plant closings on the principles of freedom of association 
and the right of workers to organize. The format of the public forum, held on 
February 27, 1996, was similar to the Honeywell/General electric meeting in 1994. 
The CWA had earlier filed unfair labor practice charges against Sprint in July 
1994. The union alleged that Sprint violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by its 
tactics prior to the filing of the election petition and that the plant closure was 
motivated by antiunion animus. After reviewing this evidence and the relevant 
legal principles, the NLRB determined that the decision to close La Conexion 
Familiar violated Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. In addition, it confirmed that the 
employer had violated Section 8(a)(1) by its other activities. Sprint has appealed 
the decision to the Court of Appeals, so the litigation is unlikely to end until some 
time in 1998, at the earliest. 
The SUTSP (U.S. N A O No. 9601) Case 
In June 1996 the U.S. NAO received a petition jointly submitted by Human 
Rights Watch/Americas, the International Labor Rights Fund, and the National 
Association of Democratic Lawyers (the latter is based in Mexico City).3 The 
submission arose from a dispute over the representation of employees of the federal 
government at the Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources, and Fisheries 
(Secretaria de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca, SEMARNAP), a new 
ministry formed in 1994 that merged the former Ministries of Development, 
Agriculture and Water Resources, and Fisheries. The dispute arose when a new 
union (SNTSMARNAP)4 was registered to represent employees of the new minis-
try. The union representing the 2,300 workers in the Fisheries Ministry, the Single 
Union of Workers of the Fisheries Ministry (Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la 
Secretaria de Pesca, SUTSP), had applied for a name change to reflect the 
consolidated ministry. 
Its request was denied by the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Tribunal 
(FCAT) on the grounds that the Fisheries Ministry no longer existed as a legal 
entity. When the new union was registered in March 1995, the ministry notified 
the tribunal that two unions were registered to represent employees at the minis-
1
 Petition Submitted to the USNAO by Human Ritrht* union was itself a merger of the former ministry un-
Watch/Americas. The International Labor Right* ions; the union of the agriculture and water resources 
Fund, and the National Association of Democratic ministry had been by far the largest. 
Lawyers, June 13. 19%. 
1
 Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Secretaria 
del Medio Ambiente. Recursos Naturales y Pesca. This 
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try, in violation of the law. The new union then successfully sought de-registration 
of the SUTSP. Although an appeals court later ordered the tribunal to restore the 
SUTSP's registration, the tribunal delayed in notifying the ministry of its decision, 
precluding the SUTSP from engaging in union representation functions with the 
ministry.5 As a result of subsequent appeals of tribunal decisions by the SUTSP, 
the new union's registration was withdrawn, and elections were held to determine 
which union would represent employees of the new ministry. Secret-ballot elections 
held on October 4, 1996 gave representation rights to the new union, the SNT-
SMARNAP. Nonetheless, the submission charged that procedural delays and the 
new ministry's continued support of the SNTSMARNAP prior to the election gave 
this union an unfair advantage over the SUTSP. 
The submission to the NAO raises issues of freedom of association, procedural 
guarantees of the NAALC that require the Parties to maintain impartial labor 
tribunals, and compliance by Mexico with international conventions to which it is a 
signatory.6 The petitioners charged that the freedom of association rights of 
ministry employees were violated by Mexican federal labor law, which stipulates 
that no more than one union can exist in a government ministry or entity, and 
which provided that unions in this sector could belong only to one federation, the 
Federation of Public Service Employees (Federacion de Sindicatos de Trabajadores 
al Servicio del Estado, FSTSE). The submission charges that this law contradicts 
both the Mexican Constitution, which guarantees freedom of association, and 
international agreements and conventions on freedom of association to which 
Mexico is a signatory.7 Also at issue in the submission was the impartiality of 
Mexico's Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Tribunal (FCAT) in the case. Labor 
representatives on the tribunal were from the FSTSE, a federation formally linked 
to the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). In contrast, the SUTSP, 
although affiliated with the FSTSE, had a history of independent action. The 
submission charges that the labor representatives in this case favored the new 
union, which was formally backed by the FSTSE. 
The U.S. NAO as part of its review, held a public hearing in Washington, 
D.C., on December 3, 1996 and commissioned special studies on labor law enforce-
ment in the federal sector in Mexico. The U.S. NAO report recommended ministe-
rial consultations with the Secretary of Labor of Mexico "for the purpose of 
examining the relationship between and the effect of international treaties, such as 
ILO Convention 87, and constitutional provisions on freedom of association on the 
national labor laws of Mexico."8 On the petitioners' charge questioning the imparti-
ality of the government tribunal, the NAO found that, in spite of the appearance of 
lack of impartiality created by the presence of FSTSE representatives, existing 
procedures to address allegations of conflict of interest were used in this case. The 
SUTSP did not appeal the election outcome, although it later regained its registra-
tion. This marks the only case in the federal sector in which two unions are 
registered in the same ministry. 
5
 U.S. National Administrative Office. Bureau of In-
ternational Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, 
NAO Submission No. 9061: Public Report of Review, 
January 27, 1997. pp. 4-5. 
fi
 NAO Submission No. 9061: Public Report of Review, 
January 27. 1997. p. 2. 
'These include Convention 87 of the International 
Labor Organization. the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention 
on Human Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 
8
 NAO Submission No. 9061: Public Report of Review. 
p. 33. 
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The Maxi-Switch (U.S. NAO No. 9602) Case 
In October 1996 the U.S. NAO received a submission from the Communica-
tions Workers of America (CWA), the Mexican Telephone Workers' Union 
(STRM), and the Federation of Unions of Goods and Services Companies 
(FESEBS), involving violations of workers' freedom of association in an attempt to 
form a union at the Maxi-Switch facility in Cananea, Sonora, in northern Mexico.9 
Maxi-Switch, a subsidiary of Taiwan-based Silitek Corporation (its main U.S. office 
is in Tucson), manufactures keyboards for computers and game sets. In November 
1995 workers at the facility tried to register an independent union (affiliated with 
the FESEBS) with the local arbitration and conciliation board. The union's 
registration was denied because the board contended that the company had 
already signed a contract with a union in the plant. 
The case brings up a familiar problem in the Mexican context: the existence of 
"protection contracts," contract agreements signed between employers and "phan-
tom" unions (often tied to "official" union organizations) in which the workers are 
frequently unaware that they are represented by a union. Such contracts have 
been used traditionally in Mexico in order to preempt independent union organiz-
ing efforts (although Mexican law does not forbid more than one union at a 
worksite from obtaining its registration, in practice federal and local boards have 
often denied registration to independent unions on the grounds that a union 
already exists at a particular worksite).10 Protection contracts are common in small 
and medium businesses and in the maquiladora sector. In this case, the union in 
place at the Maxi-Switch facility was affiliated with the "official" Confederation of 
Mexican Workers (CTM). The STRM is a politically independent union that has 
recently spearheaded a major reform movement among Mexican unions.11 The 
FESEBS is an independent labor federation that counts the STRM among its 
affiliated unions.12 
The U.S. NAO accepted the submission for review in December 1996. As part 
of the review, the NAO scheduled a public hearing to be held in Tucson, Arizona on 
April 18, 1997. Three days before the hearing was to be held, the independent 
union was granted its registration at the Maxi-Switch plant. (The workers at Maxi-
Switch had refiled for registration after the NAALC complaint was submitted). 
Authorities agreed to hold an election (recuento) to determine which union would 
gain bargaining rights at the plant. Given this outcome, the three petitioners 
withdrew their submission with the NAO, and the public hearing was canceled. 
Canada's Status Under the NAALC 
With Manitoba's and Quebec's ratification of the NAALC in January and 
February 1997, Canada reached the threshold that enables it to participate fully in 
the NAALC. However, any submissions about Canada may proceed to ministerial 
consultations or higher levels of treatment only on violations occurring under 
federal jurisdiction or in the provinces of Alberta, Manitoba, or Quebec, the only 
9
 Submission to the United States National Adminis-
trative Office (NAO) Regarding Persistent Pattern of 
Failure to Enforce and Discrimination in the Adminis-
tration of Mexican Labor Law: The Case of Maxi-
Switch, Inc., in Cananea, Mexico, October 11, 1996. 
10
 Only one union may gain title to the collective 
bargaining agreement, however. Bargaining rights are 
usually granted to the majority union, determined via 
an election (recuento). 
" Known as the Foro, this group of approximately 25 
unions has recently announced plans to create an 
independent labor central as an alternative to the pro-
government Labor Congress, which is dominated by 
the CTM. 
'- The FESEBS unites about nine unions, among them 
unions in telecommunications, electric power, airlines. 
autos, and state and municipal government employ-
ees. It was formed in 1990 and received its registra-
tion as a federation in 1992. The FESEBS participates 
in the Foro. 
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three provinces to have ratified the NAALC. Prior to achieving the threshold level 
of 35 percent coverage of the Canadian labor force, submissions on the U.S. and 
Mexico could be brought before the Canadian NAO, but these could only proceed to 
the review stage, and neither the U.S. or Mexico would be obligated to respond or 
consult with Canada during review. Similarly, before 1997 cases could be brought 
before the U.S. or Mexican NAOs regarding alleged violations in Canada, but the 
Canadian NAO would not be obligated to consult with the US or Mexican NAOs in 
the event of a review unless it involved a case arising in the federal sector or 
Alberta. However, no submissions were brought in Canada nor in Mexico and the 
U.S. alleging violations in Canada during this period. 
In 1996 the Alberta Union of Provincial Employees and the Canadian Associ-
ation of Labor Lawyers announced plans to present a submission under the 
NAALC to the U.S. NAO protesting the Alberta government's plans to privatize 
the oversight and enforcement of its employment standards. Some observers 
believe that this announcement played a role in the government's withdrawal of its 
plans. No case was brought under the NAALC.13 
The Canada-Chile Agreement 
In 1996 a bilateral trade agreement was negotiated between the governments 
of Canada and Chile. Given the delay in admitting Chile to the NAFTA and the 
debate over fast-track authority in the U.S. Congress, Canada proceeded to 
negotiate a trade agreement with Chile that would ease Chile's eventual accession 
to the NAFTA. With a similar objective Canada and Chile negotiated an Agree-
ment on Labour Cooperation that closely paralleled the NAALC. In fact, the 
preamble of the agreement explicitly states the desire of the parties "to facilitate 
the accession of Chile to the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation."14 
However, there are some differences between the Canada-Chile agreement on labor 
and the NAALC. The NAALC allows for the possibility of suspension of benefits in 
the case of a Party's persistent pattern of failure to enforce domestic legislation 
concerning child labor, minimum wage, and occupational heath and safety. The 
Canada-Chile agreement calls only for fines (monetary enforcement assessments) 
for infractions in these areas. As a final stage in the proceedings the Canada-Chile 
agreement also calls for national courts to handle disputes.15 In this case, the 
Chilean Supreme Court or the court of competent jurisdiction in Canada could 
order the enforcement of the determination made by the arbitral panel, a mecha-
nism that is missing in the NAALC. 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE NAALC CASES 
The NAALC with its emphasis on consultation, training and education may 
seem weak to those concerned with protection of labor and human rights. On the 
other hand, none of the three nations in NAFTA was prepared to yield enforcement 
powers (and part of its national sovereignty) to an international body. Given these 
constraints, what conclusions can be drawn about the application of the NAALC in 
the first three years of its existence? 
Of a total of seven cases submitted since NAALC came into effect in 1994. six 
cases were submitted to the U.S. NAO and one to the Mexican NAO. Two of these 
13See "Province's Hall of Privatization Plan Ends 
Looming NAFTA Complaint." Inside NAFTA, De-
cember 25. 1996. p. 14. 
14
 Agreement on Labour Cooperation Between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Republic of Chile. 
15
 Agreement on Labour Cooperation Between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Republic of Chile, p. 21: Bureau of National Affairs. 
Daily Labor Report. No. 11. January 16. 1997. p. C-4. 
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cases did not pass beyond the review stage (GE and Honeywell), two were 
withdrawn after their acceptance by the U.S. NAO (a follow-up to the General 
Electric case and Maxi-Switch), and three (Sony, Sprint, SUTSP) proceeded to the 
highest level possible for cases involving freedom of association and protection of 
the right to organize—ministerial consultations. All of the cases so far have 
addressed the same principle—freedom of association and protection of the right to 
organize. No cases have yet been brought that would be eligible to proceed to the 
level of an evaluation committee of experts or an arbitral panel.16 Therefore, the 
full potential of the NAALC to call attention to labor rights violations in North 
America remains untested. 
The NAALC has had several positive effects that make it worth exploring 
further as a mechanism to shed light on labor rights violations in the three 
countries, to increase understanding of how labor rights and standards are enforced 
in the continent, and to serve as added leverage for unions and other labor 
advocacy groups in specific campaigns or reform efforts. First, despite their limited 
number, the six cases subject to the NAALC procedures have enabled interested 
parties to examine specific features of Mexican, Canadian and U.S. labor law. A 
body of materials on these subjects in the three languages of the parties has 
improved the ability of policy makers to understand labor relations practices and 
law in the two countries subject to the submissions. 
Second, the NAALC procedures have operated quickly compared with the 
labor tribunals in the U.S. and Mexico. In the Sprint case, for instance, the public 
forum occurred one year after the CWA submission. This stands in sharp contrast 
to the 18-month interval between the filing of unfair labor practice charges by the 
CWA and the "final" decision by the NLRB, a process that will be protracted 
further by the judicial appeal. 
A third significant development is the U.S. NAO's progressively broader 
interpretation of its mandate in accepting cases for review and in the terms of the 
review process itself. Whereas the GE and Honeywell cases involved fairly narrow 
and technical readings of the NAO's purview, in subsequent filings (Sony, SUTSP) 
the NAO acknowledged the need to confer more on the "underlying structure" of 
aspects of Mexican labor law: particularly the union registration process and the 
system of labor boards and tribunals. With each submission the review process has 
tended to broaden from evaluating whether a government effectively enforces its 
own legislation toward questioning whether the legislation upholds the labor 
principles in the NAALC. 
Fourth, unions in the U.S. and Mexico which have made submissions have 
used these procedures to call attention to the difficulties they face in obtaining 
representation for workers in the two countries. The outcome of the Maxi-Switch 
case indicates that this form of moral suasion may have had an effect. The SUTSP 
case called attention to a possible constitutional flaw in Mexican legislation 
regulating public sector labor relations. The unions who have participated in the 
public forums have displayed a sense of the value of these proceedings. At the San 
Francisco forum on Sprint, for instance, senior union officials from the three 
NAFTA countries, plus Germany and the international union body for telecommu-
nications unions participated, as did a staff person for members of the U.S. House 
of Representatives. 
"• Eight of the eleven labor principles qualify for three of these can proceed to review by an arbitral 
treatment by an evaluation committee of experts, and panel. 
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Finally, the positive effects of the publicity generated by NAALC submissions 
and review processes—the "sunshine" factor—should not be underestimated. In 
Alberta the threat of filing a NAALC case headed off the provincial government's 
proposed reform, while in Mexico the NAALC filing and imminent hearing on the 
Maxi-Switch case helped secure the registration of an independent union in an 
important sector. Similarly, the Sprint case helped the CWA to draw international 
attention to the company's anti-union activities. The case also led to the first 
trinational comparative study on the effect of plant closings and the threat of plant 
closings on workers' right to organize, a document which could conceivably prove 
useful in U.S. unions' efforts to strengthen labor law protections during organizing 
campaigns.17 Further, by raising questions regarding the way freedom of associa-
tion is upheld by Mexican legislation, the SUTSP case adds to the debate in that 
country over the shape of future labor law reform. 
Parties who oppose the side agreements such as NAALC on the grounds that 
they are too weak, face the risk of losing the opportunity to influence protection of 
labor rights in future trade agreements. While pursuit of a "best" option of labor 
rights in core trade agreements with sanctions may be important, it is valuable to 
recall that a "second best" option of labor side agreements is better than no labor 
protection at all. The NAALC benefits labor, and interested parties should utilize 
the procedures it contains while seeking opportunities to improve it. 
LABOR STANDARDS OR LABOR GUIDELINES? 
Labor, government and now increasingly, employers have tacitly acknowl-
edged that despite its best intentions and efforts, agreements such as NAALC are 
not going to be very effective in wide diffusion of fair labor practices across a large 
number of employers spread across industries and countries. So, another set of 
initiatives are underway to ensure fair labor practices which are likely to comple-
ment rather than supplant NAALC-type procedures. These efforts are multi-
lateral in that several parties such as labor, government, employers and consumer 
groups may be involved. The approach is to develop general guidelines and set up a 
monitoring system to report periodically on abuses. There are few sanctions except 
the hope that bad publicity surrounding reported abuse will either shame the 
employer into compliance or create sufficient consumer boycott to bring about 
compliance. 
Since the passage of NAFTA, a number of unions including UNITE, have 
waged a public relations campaign against makers of consumer products such as 
apparel, shoes and toys. In 1996, UNITE held press conferences in several U.S. and 
Canadian cities to let workers from sweatshops in low wage countries speak directly 
to the press. These workers documented cases of long hours, child labor, low pay 
and unsafe working conditions among other alleged abuses. 
In one well publicized case, Nike, the U.S.-based manufacturer of shoes, has 
hired Andrew Young who has served in the past as Mayor of Atlanta and U.S. 
ambassador to the U.N., to audit labor practices throughout its international 
operations18 Responding to criticisms by labor and human rights groups, Nike 
claims to have updated its code governing working conditions at all its plants 
world-wide. The critics see this as a public relations exercise rather than as a 
substantive framework for labor protection. Young will report directly to Nike 
17
 This plant closing study was undertaken by the 
Labor Secretariat and will become available later this 
year. 
"• Canedy. Dana. "Housedeaning. or Image-Buffing?" 
Herald Tribune. March 27. 1997. p. 13. 
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which asserts that it will act on Young's recommendations but has not agreed to 
making the report fully public. 
In another instance in the apparel industry, the U.S. Department of Labor 
under the orders of its outgoing chief, Robert Reich, set up a taskforce with 
representatives from firms, labor and consumer groups in July 1996, to develop a 
code that would help firms ensure that their products are not made under abusive 
or exploitative conditions. The taskforce includes firms such as Nike, Reebok, Liz 
Claiborne, and L.L. Bean among others. Unions such as UNITE, consumer groups 
like the National Consumers League and celebrity talk show host Kathie Lee 
Gifford whose designer-label line of clothes are sold by Wal-Mart stores are also 
members of the taskforce. After an intense debate, the taskforce had reportedly 
reached an agreement in April 1997 on a code19 However, there was no agreement 
at the time on how best to implement the accord and monitor compliance, a task 
that is likely to occupy the taskforce well into the second half of 1997. 
Employers swear to abide by the code and it is likely that compliant firms 
may develop a label such as "No Sweat" to inform the consumer that their product 
was made under fair labor conditions. While the agreement itself is a "break-
through," tough hurdles on compliance and monitoring need to be overcome. For 
example, the employers would like to assign the monitoring task to accounting 
firms specializing in audit procedures. Labor groups fear that accounting firms 
would invariably adopt a pro-business stance. They would like to assign the task to 
human rights groups. Even if some compromise can be reached on this issue, the 
parties will still have to agree on penalties that would be imposed on the non-
compliant. Will non-compliance in one factory on one item of the code render the 
entire firm non-compliant or only products made in that plant? Considering that 
there was not even a dialogue among the parties on this issue two years ago, it 
would seem that there is slow but inevitable progress in this case in protecting 
labor rights under free trade. Yet, there is no doubt that these are tentative first 
few steps in a process that is bound to keep unfolding well into the next century. If 
these efforts are successful, it may point to a model of industry-self-regulation that 
could complement formal treaties and dispute resolution procedures such as those 
embodied in NAALC. 
ECONOMIC IMPACT 
The distributional consequences of free trade are compounded by the fact that 
domestic governments increasingly find their hands tied in using domestic policies 
to assist the disadvantaged, unless such policies have positive feedback effects on 
efficiency (Gunderson 1997). This is so because governments increasingly have to 
compete for the business investment and jobs associated with that investment. 
Since capital is now more mobile, governments will be under pressure to reduce 
their costly labour regulations and standards as well as adjustment assistance 
policies. Under NAFTA, the question may be: "Are your wages, including wages in 
other parts of Mexico, set in the maquiladoras?" 
In conventional nation states, those distributional issues were often handled 
by central governments. Within such nation states, some agreement could usually 
be arrived at through the democratic political process, especially because the losers 
from adjustment consequences were also voters (Langille 1996). Under the new 
global ordering, international institutions have generally not arisen to supplant 
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those that are rendered powerless by globalization. The NAALC are industry-
specific labor guidelines discussed earlier are moves in this direction. Nevertheless, 
the power base and enforcement mechanisms of such institutions are such that they 
do not fill the vacuum created by the reduced power of governments in the old 
economic order. 
The issue is particularly relevant given the adjustment consequences that are 
emanating from trade liberalization and other inter-related pressures that are 
having similar effects. While it is virtually impossible to disentangle the separate 
and independent effect of NAFTA from the myriad of other inter-related effects, 
the general effects can be summarized as follows: 
• The impact of NAFTA is likely to be small relative to the effect of the 
myriad of other changes that are occurring, especially technological change. 
• While the overall impact is likely to be small, the impact in particular 
sectors affected by trade liberalization can be more substantial. As expected, 
wages and employment are reduced in sectors subject to greater import 
competition and they are increased in sectors experiencing export growth. This 
highlights the importance of adjustment policies to facilitate the reallocation 
of labour from declining (e.g., import impacted) sectors to expanding {e.g., 
export led) sectors. 
• Trade liberalization and international competition have likely contrib-
uted to the growing wage inequality that has occurred in Canada and 
especially the United States, although agreement is emerging that the impact 
of skill-biased technological change is more important. Displaced workers who 
lose their jobs for such reasons, tend to experience substantial wage loss, often 
in the neighbourhood of 20 - 30%. Trade liberalization also has likely reduced 
the unionnonunion wage differential since employers have a greater threat of 
locating "offshore" if union premiums are too high. 
These conclusions are generally in line with those given in last year's report of 
the IRRA-NAFTA Committee; that is, the passage of one more year has not 
necessitated a revision of those conclusions. 
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